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THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION – 
THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES 
Abstract
We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple 
characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of tech-
nical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed 
excludability  is  captured  by  the  design  of  international  law  and  the  degree  of  rivalry  is 
reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the 
high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or 
partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is 
crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. 
Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of coopera-
tion.
JEL References: Q34, C72, H87, F53 
Keywords:  pure  and  impure  public  goods,  technical  and  socially  constructed  non-
excludability,  property  rights,  coalition  formation,  free-riding,  bioeconomic  model,  shared 
fish stocks, regional fisheries management organizations. 1
1.  Introduction 
There are many cases of international and global public goods for which the decision in one 
country has consequences for other countries and which are not internalized via markets. 
Reducing  global  warming  and  the  thinning  of  the  ozone  layer  are  examples  in  case.  As 
Sandler [47], p. 221, points out: “Technology continues to draw the nations of the world 
closer together and, in doing so, has created novel forms of public goods and bads that have 
diminished somewhat the relevancy of economic decisions at the nation-state level.” The 
stabilization of financial markets, the fighting of contagious diseases and the efforts of non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have gained importance through globalization 
and the advancement of technologies.  
A central aspect in the theory of public goods is to understand the incentive structure that 
typically leads to the underprovision of public goods as well as the possibilities of mitigation. 
The incentive structure can be broadly related to the properties of public goods which are 
usually associated with two distinguishing features: non-excludability and non-rivalry, which 
can be traced back to the seminal work of Samuelson [44] and Musgrave [38]. By varying the 
degree of excludability and rivalry, various mixed forms of impure public goods emerge as 
illustrated in Table I (e.g. [10],[11],[27]).  
In terms of excludability, the expectation is that the higher the degree of excludability, the 
closer is the non-cooperative equilibrium to the optimum, but also the smaller are the gains 
from cooperation.
1 Kaul and Mendoza [27] emphasize that the perception of what is public 
and what is private has changed significantly over time. They distinguish between the intrin-
sic properties of a good, to which for instance the so-called technical excludability belongs,
1   The importance of private benefits has been emphasized for instance by Cornes and Sandler [10], 
p.  595:  "...  the  jointly  produced  private  output  can  serve  a  privatising  role,  not  unlike  the 
establishment of property rights”; or by Sandler and Sargent [50], p. 153: “private benefits act to 
raise the gains from unilateral cooperation [...] this serves to foster cooperation.”  2
and the properties assigned by society to them, to which for instance so-called socially con-
structed excludability belongs. Whereas the degree of technical excludability can be regarded 
as given, at least in the short and mid-term (e.g. through physical exclusion devices, such as 
barbed wire fences and electronic sensing devices in the fight against international terrorism), 
socially constructed excludability is determined by  the  establishment  and  enforcement  of 
property rights.
In terms of rivalry, the expectations appear to be less clear-cut. On the one hand, Sandler and 
Arce [49] convincingly show the benefit-cost duality of pure public goods and common pool 
resources. In the public good game, the costs are private and the benefits from provision are 
public. In the commons game, the benefits are private and the costs from exploitation are 
public. On the other hand, despite their formal proof of equivalence, the authors conclude 
informally that there is a difference: in politics it would be easier to establish joint action in 
public good games than joint inaction (giving up rights) in commons games.  
[Table I about here] 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no model which: 1) simultaneously captures all the 
above-mentioned properties with varying degrees (i.e. different degrees of social constructed 
and technical excludability as well as rivalry), 2) systematically analyzes their effect on the 
incentives of public good provision, and 3) tests the possibility to establish full or partial 
cooperation in a non-cooperative model of coalition formation.
2
2   A  more  comprehensive  and  systematic  analysis  is  available  on  the  relation  between  the 
aggregation technology (e.g. weakest-link, weaker link, best-shot and better shot technology) and 
the incentive of public good provision. We do not pursue this interesting aspect here; see for 
instance (e.g. [1],[2],[47],[50]). 3
In terms of the first aspect, we view international fisheries as one of the few and particularly 
interesting examples where all properties are simultaneously present.
3 The degree of technical 
and  socially  constructed  excludability  can  be  parameterized  along  the  entire  horizontal 
spectrum  in  Table  I  (parameter  d   and  D   in  our  model,  respectively;  see  section  3  for 
details). The pattern and intensity of the migration of fish stocks determines the degree of 
technical non-excludability. The design of international law (e.g. the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea in 1982) through the establishment of so-called Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) determines the spatial allocation of property rights and hence the degree of socially 
constructed excludability. Also the degree of rivalry can be parameterized along the entire 
vertical spectrum in Table I through the growth rate of the fish stock (parameter  r  in our 
model; see section 3 for details). This allows to study the duality of public goods versus 
commons in a systematic way.  
In terms of the second aspect, strategies (i.e. fishing efforts) are continuous in our model and 
equilibrium  strategies  depend  on  the  model  parameters.  Therefore,  the  level  of 
underprovision of the impure public good (i.e. “preservation of fish stocks”) can be measured 
as  the  difference  between  fully  cooperative,  partially  cooperative  and  non-cooperative 
equilibrium, physically in terms of stock levels and monetarily in terms of payoffs or rents. 
3   The sharing of water resources has similar features. Socially constructed excludability can be 
established through property rights and technical excludability may vary through the diversion of 
rivers and the erection of dams. However, many other examples feature only some properties. 
For instance, the acid rain game allows capturing various degrees of technical excludability, but 
since national boundaries are given, the degree of socially constructed excludability is not an 
issue. The same applies to the classical example of a pure public good game, climate change 
mitigation, even if we recognize the privatizing effects of ancillary or co-benefits of improved 
local air quality from climate mitigation as analyzed for instance in [34]. In the case of the 
exploration  of  the  natural  resources  in  the  Antarctic  (like,  e.g.  oil,  gas  and  minerals),  after 
property rights were properly defined and enforced, excludability would be perfect as technical 
excludability can be regarded as perfect. In terms of rivalry all examples are only located at one 
extreme of the spectrum: acid rain and climate change exhibit no rivalry at all whereas for non-
renewable resources rivalry is perfect.  4
Differences can be related to the properties of the public good and important economic and 
biological parameters that determine the production process. 
In terms of the third aspect, in the tradition of the literature on international environmental 
agreements (IEAs)
4 and the literature on international fishery agreements (IFAs)
5, we study 
the formation of self-enforcing agreements as a means to mitigate free-riding with a non-co-
operative  coalition  model.
6  However,  the  IEA-literature  has  almost  exclusively  restricted 
attention to a global emission game
7 (i.e. pure public good) and the IFA-literature
8 considered 
a renewable common resource with only one jurisdiction. In contrast, we allow for the possi-
bility that parts of the ocean may be privatized through the establishment of EEZs. Among 
EEZs and the high seas there may be links through the migration of fish. This is modelled 
with the classical Gordon-Schaefer model [21] which is extended to account for migration 
between different fishing grounds as considered for instance in [45] and [46]. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief background on the historical 
development of the management of international fisheries and the establishment of coopera-
tive agreements. In section 3, we introduce the bioeconomic model including the two-stage 
coalition formation model. According to the sequence of backward induction, we first discuss 
4   The literature on IEAs goes back to [4] and [8] and has grown immensely in recent years. For 
surveys see for instance [5] and [18].  
5   Stability  of  fishery  agreements  has  been  modelled  as  cooperative  (e.g.  [28],[31])  or  non-
cooperative  coalition  games  (e.g.  [30],[42],[43]),  but  also  as  a  dynamic  fishery  game  with 
enforcement through punishment (e.g. [22],[52]). 
6   Possible mitigation options discussed in the literature on public goods are for instance correlated 
equilibria  in  chicken  games  (e.g.  [2]),  evolutionary  stable  strategies  through  “leading  by 
example” (e.g. [1]), non-Nash behaviour in conjectural variation equilibria (e.g. [9]). Coalitions 
have only been considered from a cooperative game theory perspective (e.g. [3],[48]); but there 
the focus is not on enforcement but on sharing the gains from cooperation in the grand coalition. 
7   Exceptions are for instance [33] and [19] in the context of a repeated acid rain game, though they 
only  focus  on  the  stability  of  the  grand  coalition  and  do  not  exploit  the  relation  between 
transportation coefficients and stability. 
8   Already Crutchfield [13], p. 216, based his call for international cooperation on the observation 
that migration of fish poses a natural limit to the privatization of fishery resources: “[...] the fish 
themselves seem indisposed to accept such [privatizing] solutions.” 5
results of the second stage (section 4), then of the first stage (section 5) and finally pull 
results of both stages together in section 6, which sums up our main findings, discusses their 
policy implications and points to future research issues. 
2.  Historical Background on International Fishery Management 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that harvests 
from shared fish stocks
9 account for as much as one third of global marine capture fishery 
harvests ([16],[37]). These stocks are estimated to be particularly vulnerable and are reported 
to be heavily overexploited or even depleted in [35]. For a long time, concern mainly focused 
on the preservation of coastal fishing grounds. Some governments started to declare unilater-
ally EEZs, thus evicting all foreign fleets from what they claimed to be their private property. 
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea harmonized and legalized the various unilat-
eral declarations in assigning the right to coastal states to establish EEZs, comprising 200 
nautical miles. After some initial success, it became clear that further action was required as 
the significance of high seas fisheries had been underestimated. In particular technological 
progress, such as the introduction of fish carriers and vessels with on board fish processing 
equipment, had made the high seas resources more accessible. Increasing awareness of over-
fishing led to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Under this agreement, shared fish stocks 
are to be managed, on a region by region basis, by Regional Fisheries Management Organiza-
tions (RFMOs). There are currently 17 RFMOs in force as for example the Northwest Atlan-
tic  Fisheries  Organization  (NAFO)  and  the  North  East  Atlantic  Fisheries  Commission 
(NEAFC).
10  As  participation  in  RFMOs  is  voluntary,  cooperative  efforts  have  frequently 
been undermined by fishing activities of non-members. While there is general consensus that 
9   With shared fish stocks we summarize three categories of the FAO classification: transboundary 
stocks inhabit (or cross) the EEZs of two or more coastal states, highly migratory stocks are to be 
found both within the EEZs and the adjacent high seas and are highly migratory in nature and 
straddling stocks also cover both EEZs and the high seas but are more stationary. 
10   For an overview see for instance [37] and [17]. 6
unregulated fishing is morally reprehensible, it has not, in the past, been entirely clear what 
members of an RFMO can do to suppress it. However, also monitoring and enforcement 
among RFMO members has not been a trivial task.
11
3.  Model 
3.1  Preliminaries
Our model aims at capturing the impact of different degrees of socially constructed and tech-
nical excludability as well as the degree of rivalry on the exploitation of a common property 
resource. This is done in a systematic, though stylized way for analytical tractability. We 
assume that a given number of players  N  exploit a shared natural resource of size k . In the 
context of biological populations  k  is called the carrying capacity of the biological system, 
which we interpret as the geographical size of the system as in [41]. In our context, the 
resource is the fish stock and the system is the ocean. Parts of the system may have been 
privatized through the establishment of exclusive economic zones. Hence, there are two types 
of  geographical  zones:  the  high  seas,  abbreviated  HS ,  the  common  property  where  all 
nations can fish, and the exclusive economic zones, abbreviated  i EEZ , the private properties 
with exclusive fishing rights of coastal state i. Denoting the entire size of the system by  tot k ,
the share of the resource that is subject to open access by D , we can define: 
  HS tot k k D  and 






 .              (1) 
11   Reports that seriously and consistently measure the effectiveness of RFMOs are scarce. Some 
evidence is gathered for instance in [23] and [32]. As Willock and Lack [53], p. 32, write: “There 
appears to be some reluctance to, or at least nervousness about, establishing a standard set of 
performance indicators against which RFMOs might be held accountable and their performance 
compared.”  From  completed  self-assessment  reports  (e.g.  [39],[24],[25])  a  rather  pessimistic 
picture emerges. 7
Henceforth, we call  D  the allocation parameter for short, which measures the degree of 
socially constructed excludability in our model (see Table I). In our context, players are 
sovereign countries engaging in fishing, i.e. coastal states, with access to their own EEZ and 
the high seas. We abstract from the fact that EEZs could be of different size and that so-called 
distant water fishing nations without EEZ engage in fishing. 
The dynamics of the fish stock are captured by our biological model which is sequentially 
developed in section 3.2. Subsection 3.2.1 introduces the classical Gordon-Schaefer model, 
subsection 3.2.2 extends this model to account for the spatial allocation of property rights and 
in subsection 3.2.3 we develop the model further to capture migration of fish between differ-
ent zones. The economic model is laid out in section 3.3. It captures the strategic behavior of 
nations under various assumptions about the degree of cooperation; it also includes the defi-
nition  of  stable  cooperative  arrangements.  Since  the  biological  and  economic  model  are 
linked, we call it bioeconomic model. How this model is solved is described in section 3.4.
3.2  Biological Model
3.2.1  Classical Gordon-Schaefer Model 
The biological model is based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer model ([21] and [51]) which 
has been frequently used to analyze the steady-state of an exploited (fish) resource. The 
following three equations describe the relation between the fish stock  X , growth G  and total 
harvest H  due to individual fishing efforts  i E :
   
dX
G X H X
dt
                    (2) 
 
X
G X rX 1
k
§ ·    ¨ ¸
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H X q E
k  
  ¦                   (4) 
where t denotes time, r  the intrinsic growth rate and q the so-called catchability coefficient. 
The first equation simply states that the evolution of stock in time is driven by the difference 
between growth (i.e. regeneration) and total harvest. The second equation describes growth as 
a logistic process. When the stock is small compared to the carrying capacity k  of the system 
( X k  ), growth is essentially proportional to the stock itself, resulting in an exponential 
increase of the fish stock. However, as the stock approaches  k , growth slows down, taking 
into account the limitations of the biological system like food and space. A central parameter 
in the growth function is the growth rate  r , which is a measure for the (re-)productivity of 
the resource, and thus measures the degree of rivalry in our model (see Table I). The harvest 
function   H X  indicates that the total harvest increases with the catchability coefficient and 
the  stock  density  X / k   (both  facilitating  harvesting)  as  well  as  the  total  fishing  effort  
1   ¦
N
i i E . The fishing effort can be seen as a physical measure of the inputs devoted to harvest-
ing, such as days spent at sea. The catchability coefficient  q reflects the efficacy of the 
current fishing technology. 
In the following, we will focus on the steady-state given by dX / dt 0   , leaving aside transi-








   ¦                   (5) 
As expected, the steady-state stock 
* X  is negatively related to the total fishing effort by all 
countries.9
3.2.2  Spatial Allocation of Property Rights: Socially Constructed Excludability 
In this subsection, we extend the classical Gordon-Schaefer model and take into account the 
spatial allocation of property rights. This is derived from the socially constructed partitioning 
of  the  ocean:  the  high  seas,  which  is  subject  to  open  access  and  therefore  simultaneous 
exploitation by all parties, and the remaining area, which comprises privately owned EEZs. 
As a consequence, we now have to distinguish between the stocks  i X , i 1,...,N   , in the 
EEZs and the stock  HS X  in the high seas. Using the definitions in (1), the extension of equa-
tions (2)-(4) is straightforward: 
   
HS
HS HS HS HS
dX
G X H X
dt
                    (2a) 
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i i EEZ ,i i
dX
G X H X , i 1,...,N
dt
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k  
  ¦                  (4a) 
 
i
EEZ ,i i EEZ,i
EEZ
X
H X qE , i 1,...,N
k
                   (4b) 
Stock developments over time are given by equations (2a) and (2b) for the high seas and the 
EEZs, respectively. Growth in the respective zones is described by equations (3a) and (3b) 
whereas equations (4a) and (4b) restate the harvest function. Note that equation (4b) accounts 10
for  the  fact  that  in  each  EEZi  only  country  i  is  allowed  to  fish.  Using  vector  notation, 
  1 N HS X ,...,X ,X   X ,   1 N HS (G ,...,G ,G ) G   and    EEZ,1 EEZ,N HS (H ,...,H ,H ) H ,  the  steady-
state condition for all stocks can be described by a single equation: 





G H                   (6) 
This represents a system of N 1   independent equations, i.e. stocks in different zones are not 
linked to each other. This assumption will be relaxed for the extension we consider next. 
3.2.3  Migration Pattern: Technical Excludability 
In this subsection, we take into account that zones might not be isolated due to spillovers 
related to the degree of technical excludability. In the case of fishery, this is called migration 
of fish, dispersal or diffusion and depends (linearly, in a first order approximation) on all 
stocks  [45].  In  order  to  account  for  dispersal,  the  steady  state  condition  (6)  has  to  be 
modified:





G H X  .                (7) 
The  dispersal  matrix      ij D d   contains  all  information  needed  to  describe  the  dispersal 
process; important is not only whether zone i and zone  j  are connected via dispersal at all    
( ij d 0 z  and/or  ji d 0 z ) but also the strength of interaction, i.e. the absolute value of  ij d  and 
ji d . In our case, there are  N  EEZs which have the same property of being exploited by only 
one country, and the high seas which is different in the sense that it is exploited by all 
players. In order to analyze the dispersal pattern in a simple and tractable way, we choose an 
intuitive and symmetric arrangement of these  N 1   zones: the EEZs are arranged in a circle 
with the high seas at its center, as depicted in Figure 1. This avoids boundary effects that 11
would emerge with a linear arrangement and approximates well the geographical settings of 
many fisheries.
12
[Figure 1 about here] 
A paradigmatic example is the so-called “Donut Hole”. This area in the Bering Sea has the 
status of the high seas surrounded by the EEZs of Russia and the United States. Over-fishing 
in the high seas also threatened the fish resources in the EEZs as the fish migrated from the 
EEZs to the high seas. This phenomenon forced (among other reasons) the United States to 
agree to a multilateral convention to protect the Bering Sea from the over-exploitation of fish 
as  argued  in  [15].  The  example  stresses  that  the  interconnection  of  EEZs  and  high  seas 
crucially determines the strategic interplay between players.  
With respect to the strength of interaction, we assume that dispersal is driven by differences 
in stock densities (e.g. [46]). That is, areas with a high density, i.e. with a high stock-carrying 
capacity ratio  i i X / k  will be characterized by outgoing diffusion if the adjacent zones have a 
lower density. The reasoning behind this assumption is that fish migrate from zone i to zone 
j  if the competition for food and space in zone  j  is less fierce. Contrary to most articles 
capturing migration (e.g. [45],[46]), we are interested in a size dependent diffusion process 
which relates to areas of different size, i.e. different carrying capacities, as suggested by [29].
12   Other  possible  arrangements  as  described  in  [45]  include  sink-source  models  which  model 
dispersal as a unidirectional flow from a source to a sink and the fully integrated system in which 
all zones are directly connected to each other. The sink-source model, though it is relevant in the 
context of some specific fish species, would create some asymmetry which we try to avoid in 
this  paper  for  analytical  tractability.  In  contrast,  the  fully  integrated  system  would  preserve 
symmetry and might seem even more general at first sight. However, in the case of more than 
three players and hence  N 1 4  !  zones, it is impossible to arrange all zones such that every pair 
of zones share a border (see [20]). For the case of three players (to which we eventually have to 
revert  in  our  analysis;  see  section  3.4),  our  circular  arrangement  is  identical  to  the  fully 
integrated system. 12
The following formal description of diffusion captures this idea. We specify the components 
of the vector  DX  (instead of the entries of the dispersal matrix,  ij d ) because this directly 
defines  how  diffusion  influences  the  temporal  evolution  of  the  stock  in  each  zone  as 
described by equation (7): 
 
i 1 i i 1 i HS i
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In equations (8) and (9) each summand accounts for one dispersal process between two adja-
cent zones. Dispersal takes place between each EEZi, i {1...N }  , and its neighbors EEZi+1,
EEZi-1 and the high seas.
13 While each EEZ has three neighboring zones, namely two EEZs 
and the high seas, the high seas is connected to  N  EEZs as expressed by the sum in (9). The 
sign and intensity of diffusion is determined by differences in densities which is captured by 
the expressions in brackets. In order to include the size dependency of the process, each 
difference is multiplied by the square root of the carrying capacities of the two involved 
zones, similar as in [29]. The diffusion parameter  d , which we assume for simplicity to be 
identical for all diffusion processes, is an indicator for the intensity of diffusion and thereby a 
measure for the degree of technical non-excludability (see, e.g. [26]).
14
13   Note that, due to the circular arrangement, the neighbors of EEZ1 are EEZN and EEZ2, and the 
neighbors of EEZN are EEZN-1 and EEZ1.
14   The implication of the parameter  d  can be understood from considering a normalized example 
with carrying capacities  k 1   . If the stocks in two zones differ by a certain value G , and if this 
difference is maintained by some means, then the amount of fish that flows from one zone to the 
other in one period of time equals  dG . Note that the steady-state condition does not require 
diffusion to vanish but only to be balanced by growth and harvest in every zone. 13
3.3  Economic Model 
Each player receives an economic rent or as we call it a payoff  i 3  that is obtained from the 
harvest extracted from the private and public resource: 
 
i HS
i EEZ ,i HS,i EEZ ,i HS,i
EEZ HS
X X
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        (10) 
where p is the fish price and c is the (constant) marginal cost of fishing effort, which is 
assumed to be identical for all players for simplicity.
15 Each player i has to make two strate-
gic choices: the fishing effort in the own EEZ,  EEZ,i E , and the fishing effort in the high seas, 
HS,i E . It is a common assumption in the literature on fishery management that costs depend 
linearly  on  extraction  efforts  (e.g.  [21],[45],[41]),  though  they  are  strictly  convex  when 
expressed in terms of harvests  EEZ,i H  and  HS,i H .
Cooperation among a group of players corresponds to the establishment of an RFMO with the 
purpose of managing and conserving the fish stocks jointly. Participation in an RFMO is 
open to all nations as reflected by Article 8(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Moreover, 
states which decide against membership in an RFMO cannot be prevented from harvesting. 
In order to capture these institutional features, we choose from the set of coalition formation 
games the single coalition open membership game due to d’Aspremont et al. [14] which has 
been frequently applied in the literature on IEAs (e.g. [7], [18] for overviews) but also in 
industrial economics (e.g. [6],[54] for surveys). This coalition game is a two-stage game.  
15  The assumption of symmetric players is widespread in the literature on coalition formation, not 
only on international environmental treaties but also in the context of other economic problems 
(see e.g. [6],[54] for an overview). 14
In the first stage, players decide upon their membership. Those players that join the RFMO 
form the coalition and are called members, those that do not join are called non-members and 
act as singletons. The decisions in the first stage lead to a coalition structure  ^ ` (N-n) K C,   1
where C is the set of n coalition members,  ^ ` n 0,1,...,N  , and  (N-n) 1  is the vector of  N n 
singletons. Given the simple structure of the first stage, a coalition structure is fully charac-
terized by coalition C. In the second stage, players choose their economic strategies which 
are fishing efforts in our bioeconomic model. In each stage, strategies (participation and fish-
ing effort) form a Nash equilibrium. The game is solved backward. 
In the second stage, given some coalition C has formed in the first stage, non-members act as 
singletons and maximize their individual payoff,  i 3 , while members, acting like one player, 







  arg max
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E                   (12) 
where   EEZ ,1 EEZ ,N HS,1 HS,N E ,...,E ,E ,...,E   E  denotes the vector of all fishing efforts whereas 
  EEZ ,C EEZ ,i i C E
   E   and    HS,C HS,i i C E
   E   denote  the  vectors  of  fishing  efforts  of  the 
coalition  members  in  the  EEZs  and  in  the  high  seas,  respectively.  The  simultaneous 
maximization of (11) and (12) delivers the equilibrium fishing efforts  
* *
EEZ ,j HS,j E ,E , j C  ,
16   The assumption that members choose their fishing efforts cooperatively, both in the high seas 
and in their EEZs, is in line with FAO [16], p. 123, which states: “Each RFMO is, inter alia, 
called upon to ensure that the management measures for the high seas segments of the resources 




EEZ ,C HS,C , E E . We call this a coalitional Nash equilibrium in order to distinguish it from 
an  ordinary  Nash  equilibrium.  However,  note  that  the  coalitional  Nash  equilibrium  is 
identical to the Nash equilibrium fishing vector if coalition C comprises only a single player, 
C {i}   , or is empty C  . Moreover, if coalition C comprises all players,  ^ ` 1 C ,...,N   ,
the coalitional Nash equilibrium corresponds to the socially optimal fishing vector. Hence, 
the entire range from no cooperation, partial cooperation to full cooperation can be captured 
with this approach. 
It is worthwhile to mention that the solution to (11) and (12) will be identical for every coali-
tion ^ ` C 1,...,N  , i.e. the degree of cooperation does not matter if and only if  0 D    and all 
ij d 0   . That is, there is no externality across players. In contrast, even if all  ij d 0   , i.e. there 
is no diffusion between any zone, as long as  0 D ! , there is an area of common property 
resource that can be exploited by all countries. Even if  0 D   , i.e. all property is privately 
owned, as long as there is diffusion among at least two zones, i.e. there exists at least one 
ij d 0 ! , the action of one player has an impact on other players and hence no, partial and full 
cooperation imply different vectors of equilibrium fishing efforts. 
Equilibrium efforts 
*(C) E  derived from (11) and (12) together with the steady-state condi-
tions of stocks in (7) have to be inserted into the payoff function (10) to determine individual 
payoffs
*
j C(C ) 3   and the coalitional payoff 
*
C(C ) 3 . Since we deal with symmetric players, 
we assume an equal sharing rule among n coalition members, i.e.,    
* *
i C C (C ) (C )/ n 3 3 .
Having determined equilibrium payoffs for every possible coalition structure in the second 
stage, we can now proceed to the first stage. In the first stage, a coalition C is considered to 
be stable if it fulfills the following two conditions:  16
Internal Stability:  
No member i C   finds it profitable to deviate, i.e. the gain  i G  from leaving the coalition is 
non-positive:
* *
i i i G : (C\{i}) (C ) 0, i C 3 3    d   .
External Stability:  
No non-member  j C   finds it profitable to join the coalition, i.e. the gain  j Q  from joining 
the coalition is non-positive:  0
* *
j j j Q : (C { j}) (C ) , j C 3 3     d   .
Note that the grand coalition is externally stable by definition as there is no outsider left that 
could join the coalition. Moreover, the coalition structure of only singletons is stable by 
definition, which ensures existence of a stable coalition structure. This follows from the fact 
that this coalition structure can be supported by all players announcing not to be a member of 
the coalition, i.e. C  , and hence a deviation by one player will make no difference.  
When dealing with symmetric players, a coalition C is fully characterized by the number of 
members  n. In this case, it follows that the two conditions of internal and external stability 
are closely related (see [8]): if a coalition with  n players is not internally stable, then coali-
tion n 1   is externally stable. 
3.4  Solving Procedure 
As mentioned above, the model is solved by backward induction. The most difficult part 
relates to the second stage in which optimal fishing efforts have to be determined for a given 
coalition structure. For this, the system of equations (7), which represents the steady-state 
condition,  and  the  first-order  conditions  derived  from  (11)  and  (12)  have  to  be  solved 
simultaneously in order to obtain steady-state stocks and equilibrium fishing efforts for a 
given coalition structure. Due to the diffusion term, which links the steady-state stocks, we 17
face a highly nonlinear system of 3 1 N   equations that cannot be solved analytically. Hence, 
we have to rely on numerical simulations.  
It is evident that computing time and capacity requirements increase exponentially with the 
number of players. For this reason, we confine ourselves to the case of  N 3    players. This is 
certainly the minimum number of players that makes the analysis of coalition formation inter-
esting, but as it turns out, this is sufficient to derive interesting qualitative results. For  N 3   ,
we have to consider three possible coalition structures, namely the grand coalition, the two-
player coalitions and the all-singletons coalition structure. Furthermore, we will restrict the 
analysis to symmetric parameter values for all players. This implies symmetric equilibria in 
the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum. Moreover, all possible two-player coalitions 
are equivalent with symmetric payoffs for coalition members, though they differ from the 
payoff of a non-member. 
Simulations require the assumption of numerical values for the parameters of the model. 
Fortunately, a closer look at the system of equations reveals that results will only depend on 
few parameters. For the cost parameter  c, the price  p  and the efficiency parameter  q only
the  relation  c / pq   matters,  which  is  known  in  the  literature  as  the  “inverse  efficiency 
parameter”  (see  [36]).  Hence,  we  normalize  p  and  q  to  1,  and  only  vary  c.  Since 
prohibitive  costs  at  which  countries  quit  fishing  are  given  by  c 1 t ,  irrespective  of  the 
scenario of cooperation,  > @ , c 0 1  . In our simulations, we set the base case value to  c 0.5  
and conduct a sensitivity analysis for two other values: c 0.25    and c 0.75    (see Table II). 18
Results also depend on the growth rate  r  where we set the base value to  r 0.5    and also 
consider two other values in a sensitivity analysis: r 0.25    and r 0.75   (see Table II).
17
As the total carrying capacity  tot k  just represents a scaling factor it can be normalized to 
tot k 4    as there are four zones.
18 The spatial allocation of property rights, as captured by the 
parameter D  according to equation (1), is varied in the interval  > @ 0 1 , D  . Starting from a 
totally privatized resource ( 0 D   ), gradually increasing the degree of publicness in steps of 
0 05 . 'D   , we eventually end up in the case of a completely public resource ( 1 D   ). The 
variation also captures the case in which all zones are of equal size ( 0 25 . D   ). Finally, we 
consider  a  wide  range  of  sensible  values  for  the  diffusion  parameter  d   with 
> @ 0 1 28 max d ,d .     (see Table II).
19
[Table II about here]
The primary interest in simulation runs A, B and C is to investigate the dependency of efforts, 
stocks and payoffs on the diffusion parameter d and the allocation parameter D , measuring 
the  degree  of  technical  and  socially  constructed  excludability  of  the  common  property, 
respectively. In simulation run A, the values of the cost and growth parameter are set to their 
17 Our  base  case  values  c 0.5     and  r 0.5     are  commonly  assumed  in  the  literature  (e.g. 
[22],[52]).  Note  that  a  variation  of  the  growth  rate  in  the  range  0.25 r 0.75 d d   (as  e.g. 
considered in [40]) already has a significant impact on the outcome in terms of payoffs. For 
instance, in models with only a single zone (e.g. [41]), which correspond to  1 D    in our model, 
aggregate payoffs in the Nash equilibrium at a growth rate r 2 / 3    are already as high as in the 
social optimum at r 0.5   .
18   This is in line with the common normalization k 1    in articles that deal with only a single zone 
(e.g.  [41]).  In  our  model,  assuming  no  diffusion  between  zones  with  tot k 4     and  setting 
0.25 D    results in four isolated zones with carrying capacities k 1   . See equation (1). 
19  Strong diffusion makes the allocation of property rights, i.e. the value of D , irrelevant because 
all countries virtually exploit the same stock. Accordingly, all results converge towards the ‘only 
high seas’ limit ( 1 D   ) as  d  approaches infinity. Our choice of the upper bound  max 1.28 d  
ensures sufficient convergence, as total efforts for  1 D   and  1.28 d    differ less than 6% from 
the results for  1 D   .19
base  values,  i.e.  0 5 c .     and  0 5 r .   .  In  order  to  check  the  robustness  of  the  results,  a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted in simulation runs B and C, varying  c while keeping  r
constant and vice versa. This also provides comparative static results with respect to c and r
where the former may be viewed as an indicator of the economic attractiveness of fishing and 
the latter as an indicator of the degree of rivalry. All subsequent results are derived from all 
three simulation runs as summarized in Table II. 
4.  Results: Second Stage of Coalition Formation
In this section, we analyze how equilibrium fishing efforts, stocks and payoffs depend on the 
degree of cooperation and the crucial parameters of our model and how the various degrees 
of cooperation compare to each other. This will also provide helpful information for the inter-
pretation of the incentive structure to form stable coalitions as analyzed in the first stage of 
coalition formation in section 5. For notational convenience, we skip in the following the 
term “equilibrium”. Unless otherwise stated, we always refer to efforts, stocks and payoffs in 
the respective equilibrium (no, partial and full cooperation). 
Result 1:  The  Role  of  Diffusion  and  Allocation  of  Property  Rights  under  Full 
Cooperation (Social Optimum) 
The total fishing effort, total stock and total payoff are independent of the diffusion parameter 
d  and the allocation parameter D  where totals refer to aggregation over all players and 
zones.  
In the social optimum, the distinction between high seas and EEZs does not matter for equi-
librium strategies. Since in the social optimum externalities across all players are internalized, 
i.e. the social planner maximizes the aggregate payoff over all players and zones, diffusion 
does not matter either (cf. [12]). Hence, efforts, stocks and payoffs at the aggregate level 
depend neither on the diffusion parameter  d  nor on the allocation parameter D . Efforts are 20
distributed such that effort densities, i.e. the efforts per area  EEZ,i EEZ E / k  and  HS,tot HS E / k  are 
equal everywhere, irrespective of  d  and D . Accordingly, stock densities  EEZ,i EEZ X / k  and 
HS HS X / k  are the same in every zone and independent of d  and D . In contrast, diffusion and 
the allocation of property rights matter under no and partial cooperation. 
Result 2:  The  Role  of  Diffusion  and  Allocation  of  Property  Rights  under  No 
Cooperation (Nash Equilibrium) 
Individual  and  total  fishing  efforts  increase  with  the  diffusion  parameter  d   and  the 
allocation parameter D . Accordingly, the total stock in the entire fishing area decreases in 
d  and D . The individual payoffs of players and the total payoff over all players decrease in 
d  and D .
At the aggregate level, the higher the diffusion between zones, i.e. the lower the degree of 
technical excludability, the more will the fish stock be exploited (high fishing efforts), result-
ing  in  low  stocks.  This  translates  into  low  individual  payoffs  and  a  low  total  payoff. 
Similarly,  a  high  value  of  D ,  i.e.  a  high  degree  of  publicness  (low  socially  constructed 
excludability), aggravates over-exploitation and leads to lower stocks and payoffs.  
Whereas results at the aggregate level are clear-cut, a breakdown into efforts and stocks in the 
different zones would reveal the complexity of the underlying incentive structure. Since the 
equilibrium fish stock density in the high seas is always lower than in the EEZs (due to more 
players  fishing  there),  diffusion  will  always  flow  from  the  EEZs  to  the  high  seas.  This 
encourages fishing in the high seas with fishing efforts increasing in the value of d. The 
mirror image is found in the EEZs which suffer from outgoing diffusion. The equilibrium 
reaction does not follow a simple pattern: lower fishing efforts to preserve the own fish stock 
or higher fishing efforts to slow down diffusion to the common property high seas. These 21
countervailing forces lead to some ambiguity in terms of equilibrium fishing efforts in the 
EEZ as a function of d  which is not apparent from the aggregate values.
20
Viewed together, the results illustrate that there is an interesting and subtle incentive structure 
when players behave non-cooperatively if zones are linked through diffusion. This complex 
incentive structure carries over to the situation where some players behave cooperatively, but 
not all, as considered under partial cooperation.
Result 3:  The  Role  of  Diffusion  and  Allocation  of  Property  Rights  under  Partial 
Cooperation
Consider a coalition with two players. Coalitional fishing efforts may increase or decrease in 
the diffusion parameter d , but they decrease in the allocation parameter D . Fishing efforts 
of outsiders increase in  d  and D . The total effort in the entire fishing area increases in  d
and D . Accordingly, the total stock in the entire fishing area decreases in  d  and D . The 
individual payoffs of signatories and the total payoff over all players decrease in d  and D ,
though the outsider’s payoff increases in d  and D .
A general conclusion from Result 3 is that partial cooperation shares many features with no 
cooperation, quite different from those under full cooperation. As long as not all externalities 
are  internalized  across  all  players,  the  strategic  interaction  between  members  and  non-
members  implies  that  a  low  degree  of  technical  (i.e.  high  value  of  d )  and  socially 
constructed (i.e. high value of D ) excludability has a detrimental effect on the total stock and 
total payoff. This is because the outsider, who is in the position of a free-rider, benefits from 
increased diffusion. Free-riding is particularly attractive the larger the area of the common 
property resource (high value of  D ). It is exactly then when, in equilibrium, the coalition 
chooses low fishing efforts to preserve the common pool resource. Only the optimal reaction 
20   Also in [26] it is recognized that a density-dependent diffusion process can create a destructive 
incentive to overexploit one’s own fishing grounds in order to attract incoming diffusion. 22
of the coalition as a function of the diffusion parameter d  is less clear-cut. On the one hand, 
high diffusion encourages exploitation of the high seas through the coalition; on the other 
hand,  the  inflow  from  the  high  seas  comes  from  two  EEZs  belonging  exclusively  to  its 
members. 
The  strategic  interplay  between  players  is  also  evident  from  the  following  results  which 
compare individual equilibrium fishing efforts (Result 4 a), total equilibrium fishing efforts 
(Result 4 b), and total equilibrium stocks and payoffs (Result 5) for the three scenarios of 
cooperation.
Result 4:  Individual and Total Fishing Efforts under Different Degrees of Cooperation 
a) Let  the  individual  total  fishing  efforts  in  all  zones  under  full,  no  and  partial 
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b) Let the total fishing effort in the entire area under full, no and partial cooperation be 
denoted by 
F E ,
N E , and 
P E , respectively, then 
N P F E E E t t .
Compared to no cooperation, under partial cooperation the two-player coalition reduces its 
fishing efforts, being aware of the mutual externalities in the high seas, between coalition 
members’ EEZs and between all these zones. However, the coalitional efforts to preserve the 
fish stock under their control are thwarted by the free-rider whose effort levels are increased 
compared to no cooperation. This “leakage effect” is due to the downward sloping reaction 
function of the coalition and of the outsider as fishing efforts are strategic substitutes as 
frequently observed in the context of public goods. However, despite this leakage effect, total 
fishing efforts decrease under partial compared to no cooperation. Technically, this implies 
that the slopes of the reaction functions are smaller than one in absolute terms. 23
As will be analyzed in Section 5, the leakage effect is a driving force why self-enforcing 
cooperation  proves  difficult  and  will  only  be  successful  in  a  few  cases.  The  next  result 
compares fish stocks and payoffs at an aggregate level, resulting from fishing efforts under 
various  degrees  of  cooperation.  In  order  to  measure  the  importance  of  cooperation  as  a 
function of our model parameters, we consider relative normalized differences related to the 
benchmark full cooperation. 
Result 5:  Total Stocks and Payoffs under Different Degrees of Cooperation 
Let the total fish stock in the entire area and the total payoff under full, no and partial 
cooperation be denoted by 
F X ,
N X , and 
P X , and 
F 3 ,
N 3  and 
P 3 , respectively, then 
a)
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with strict inequalities under a) and b) if either  ! d 0  or  0 D ! .
Result 5 stresses that already partial cooperation can improve upon no cooperation, not only 
in terms of payoffs but also in terms of stock levels (cf. [42]). Moreover, the importance of 
cooperation, either partial or full, increases with the degree of interconnectedness between 
players. That is, the importance increases the lower the degree of technical and socially con-
structed excludability, i.e. the higher the diffusion parameter  d  and the higher the spatial 
allocation parameter D  are. In other words, if  d  and/or D  are high, we would hope that full 
cooperation or at least partial cooperation is stable which is tested in section 5. In contrast for 
low values, cooperation does not matter much anyway. 24
The next result looks at the effect of a variation of the cost parameter  c, reflecting the unit 
production cost of fishing, and the growth parameter  r , reflecting by how much the stock 
recovers from fishing and our indicator of the degree of rivalry. 
Result 6:  The  Role  of  the  Cost  Parameter  c  and  the  Growth  Parameter  r  under 
Different Degrees of Cooperation 
a) Equilibrium efforts and payoffs decrease while stocks increase in the cost parameter  c.
This holds at the individual as well as at the aggregate level, irrespective of the diffusion 




































decrease in c whenever there is diffusion. 
b) Equilibrium efforts and payoffs increase in the growth parameter  r . This holds at the 
individual as well as at the aggregate level, irrespective of the diffusion parameter  d , the 
allocation parameter D  and the degree of cooperation. Under full cooperation, equilibrium 
stocks are independent of  r . Under no and partial cooperation the total stock increases in r 





































 decrease in r whenever there is diffusion.  
The intuition of part a) of Result 6 is straightforward. With increasing unit production costs, 
equilibrium fishing efforts are reduced, resulting in lower payoffs, though higher fish stocks. 
Thus from an ecological point of view, higher production costs help to preserve fish stocks 
but from an economic point of view it reduces economic rents. Shrinking rents under all 
scenarios of cooperation with increasing costs also implies that the relative differences in 25
total payoffs between scenarios become smaller. Thus, the need for cooperation decreases in 
the cost parameter c .
It may be worthwhile to recall that not the absolute value of c matters for results but the ratio 
c
pq. Thus, a higher c has the same effect as a lower price  p or a lower catchability coeffi-
cient q, measuring the technological efficiency of harvesting fish. Hence, a high price and 
technological efficiency are detrimental to the ecological system but conducive to economic 
rents and make cooperation particularly valuable from a normative point of view. 
Also part b) of Result 6 is in line with intuition. A high growth rate encourages fishing and is 
associated with an economic advantage. However, higher fishing efforts do not necessarily 
imply lower stocks as the resource recovers more quickly with a high growth rate  r . Only if 
diffusion  is  irrelevant,  e.g.  there  is  full  cooperation  or  the  entire  fishing  area  is  public 
( 1 D   ), a higher growth rate is exactly balanced by higher fishing efforts and hence the 
equilibrium  stock  remains  constant.  However,  if  diffusion  matters,  e.g.  there  is  no  full 
cooperation, then the growth effect is stronger than the exploitation effect. Consequently, 
stocks and also payoffs in increase with growth parameter  r - our measure of rivalry and the 
need for cooperation decreases.  
5.  Results: First Stage of Coalition Formation
In this section we analyze stability of coalitions. As noted above in subsection 3.3, the all-
singletons coalition structure, corresponding to no cooperation or the Nash equilibrium, is 
stable by definition. Hence, we are interested whether and under which conditions full or par-
tial cooperation could be a second equilibrium. We start by considering the first-best solution 
of full cooperation, corresponding to the social optimum. 26
Result 7: Stability of Full Cooperation 
The incentive to leave the grand coalition is always positive, except for  d 0    and  0 D   ,
irrespective of the values of  c  and  r . If  d 0    and  0 D   , however, there is no gain from 
cooperation. The incentive to leave increases in d  and D .
Result 7 is discouraging. Not only because full cooperation is never stable but also because 
the  free-rider  incentive  is  particularly  pronounced  under  those  conditions  when  it  would 
matter most. This follows immediately from Result 5 which states that cooperation would be 
most desirable in the case of a strong externality as expressed by a high diffusion coefficient 
d and a large share of the public domain, corresponding to a high value of D . It is evident 
that d 0   and 0 D   is a special case: there is no common property, and there is no diffusion 
between EEZs. Due to the lack of interdependency, there is no externality and hence full, no 
and partial cooperative fishing efforts coincide. Consequently, the incentive to deviate is zero 
but there is also no gain from cooperation. In a next step, we investigate whether partial coop-
eration can be stable. 
Result 8: Stability of Partial Cooperation 
The incentive to leave the two-player coalition is positive if either  d  or D  are sufficiently 
large. However, for sufficiently small values of  d  and  D , there is a range of parameter 
values for which partial cooperation is stable. This range increases in the cost parameter c
and the growth parameter r .
In order to understand better the underlying driving forces of Result 8, Figure 2 has a closer 
look at the stability of a two-player coalition for various values of the parameters d  and D .
The fact that the grand coalition is never internally stable according to Result 7, allows us to 
conclude that a two-player coalition is always externally stable. Hence, Figure 2a focuses on 27
internal stability. Internal stability holds for all parameter combinations for which the incen-
tive to leave a two player coalition is non-positive.
[Figure 2, a and b about here]
There are two countervailing effects. On the one hand, the larger D  (d ), the lower the degree 
of socially constructed (technical) excludability, the larger would be the gains from coopera-
tion.  On  the  other  hand,  with  increasing  D   (d ),  also  the  incentive  to  deviate  sharply 
increases, as already observed for the grand coalition in Result 7. Overall, a two-player coali-
tion will only be internally stable, if D  and d  are sufficiently small.  
A closer analysis of intermediate values illustrated in Figure 2b reveals that cooperation fails 
whenever 0 02 . D t  or  0 32 d . t  for the base values of the cost parameter ( 0 5 c .   ) and the 
growth parameter ( 0 5 r .   ). The boundary value for d  increases in c and r . Higher produc-
tion costs discourage fishing (see Result 6a), and therefore lower the free-riding incentive and 
increase the upper bound of  d  for which partial cooperation is stable. Higher growth rates 
have  a  positive  effect  on  stock  levels  (see  Result  6b),  and  therefore  lower  free-riding 
incentives and hence also push the upper bound of  d  up for which partial cooperation is 
stable. Thus, the lower the degree of rivalry, the higher the likelihood of a stable coalition. 
However, even for high values of c and r , the range of stability remains rather small. Rais-
ing both base values of  c and  r  from 0.5 to the maximum value 0.75 considered in our 
simulations, cooperation fails whenever  0 02 . D t  and  0 72 d . t , corresponding to the larger 
triangle in Figure 2b.
6.  Overall Results and Conclusions
In  this  section,  we  discuss  our  results  by  pulling  the  two  stages  of  coalition  formation 
together and relate them to a wider context. 28
Partial and full cooperation would make a big difference compared to no cooperation when-
ever the public domain of the resource is larger (large values of D ) and the migration of fish 
stocks is large (high values of  d ) (Result 5). However, exactly under these conditions not 
even partial cooperation is stable (Result 8), letting alone full cooperation (Result 7). Given 
this paradox of cooperation, one may derive some comfort from Results 2 and 3 which show 
that payoffs and stocks under no and partial cooperation decrease in D  and d . Hence from a 
normative point of view, one would hope for small values of D  and d  as this has a positive 
effect on payoffs and stocks and increases the chances of at least partial cooperation.
The performance of some international fishery agreements seems to be in line with our model 
predictions. The agreement on the aforementioned “Donut Hole” appears to be stable and 
successful since the moratorium is respected by and large. It relates to a relatively small area 
of high seas (about 8 % of the entire Bering Sea) and regulates a species (Alaska Pollock) 
that does not belong to the list of highly migratory stocks. In contrast, the poor performance 
of most tuna-related RFMOs, such as the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), represents a good example of failing cooperation (e.g. [24],[25]). It 
is in line with our results that failure occurs in the context of highly migratory species (which 
most tuna species are) and fishing areas that comprise a large portion of the high seas.
Though  the  degree  of  technical  excludability  is  given,  this  is  different  for  the  degree  of 
socially constructed excludability. Our results suggest that the declaration of EEZs was a 
sensible step in alleviating the tragedy of the commons in fisheries, at least if fish stocks are 
not  highly  migratory.  Further  expansion  of  these  zones  may  be  worthwhile  to  consider. 
Whether such an expansion would receive sufficient political support in an amended UN 
Convention is difficult to predict. In our simple model, the endogenous choice of D  could be 
introduced by a voting procedure preceding stage 1 and 2. Two cases can be distinguished. If 29
all  parameters  except  D   are  such  that  partial  cooperation  cannot  be  stable  anyway 
(sufficiently large  d ; small  c
pq and  r ; see Result 8), all players would vote for  0 D    as 
payoffs under no cooperation decrease with D  (Result 2). In contrast, if partial cooperation is 
possible, then coalition members prefer  0 D    and the free-rider prefers the maximum value 
of D  which is still small enough such that stability of the coalition is not jeopardized (Results 
3 and 8). On which of the proposals players will agree in this case depends on the voting rule. 
For instance, under unanimity voting, the free-rider would have veto power and could block 
any value of D  below his optimum. Hence, not the entire fishing ground would be privatized. 
In terms of the economic parameters (c=unit production cost,  p=price and  q=catchability 
coefficient),  the  higher  the  ratio  c
pq,  the  higher  are  stocks  regardless  of  the  degree of 
cooperation (Result 6a), the higher are the chances to establish at least partial cooperation 
(Result 8), but the lower are economic rents and the need for cooperation (Result 6a). Hence, 
also with respect to this ratio, the paradox of cooperation is present. This is even more true 
because if this ratio is high, though partial cooperation may be possible and stocks are high, 
payoffs will be low. Hence, economic and ecological interests are opposed to each other.  
Historically, the ratio  c
pq has fallen dramatically in the course of the last century. Fish 
prices  have  gone  up  due  to  scarcity  and  technical  as  well  as  economic  efficiency  of 
production have improved tremendously over time. Our results suggest that this could have 
aggravated the problem of overfishing – fish stocks have fallen and the need for cooperation 
has  increased  but  the  chances  of  establishing  partial  cooperation  have  deteriorated. 
Auctioning fishing quotas or imposing a tax would seem obvious measures to increase the 
ratio c
pq. However, this conclusion may be premature as it does not address the question of 30
how such a policy can be implemented self-enforcingly if a RFMO does not comprise all 
fishing nations. Moreover, technical progress will unavoidably continue to push for a lower 
c and higher q in the long term. 
Finally, our results indicate that the higher the growth (which is inversely related to the 
degree  of  rivalry),  the  less  vulnerable  a  stock  is  to  overexploitation  and  the  higher  are 
economic rents irrespective of cooperation (Result 6b; see also, e.g. [16]). Hence, economic 
and ecological interests coincide. Moreover, the higher the growth rate, the higher are the 
chances to establish partial cooperation (Result 8), though again we face the paradox of 
cooperation as the need for cooperation becomes smaller (Result 6b).  
Viewed together, our model facilitates to formally capture various degrees of technical and 
socially  constructed  excludability  and  rivalry,  their  impact  on  the  absolute  and  relative 
differences  between  no,  partial  and  full  cooperation  as  well  as  on  the  success  of  stable 
cooperative  agreements.  We  could  confirm  the  expectation  that  the  higher  the  degree  of 
excludability, the closer is the non-cooperative equilibrium to the optimum and hence the 
smaller the gains from cooperation. Moreover, we could show that only if the cooperative 
gains are small due to a high degree of excludability, partial cooperation may be possible and 
full  cooperation  is  only  stable  in  the  limited  case  if  excludability  is  perfect  but  then 
cooperative gains are zero. A similar paradox of cooperation has been found for the degree of 
rivalry and the cost benefit ratio from production in our model. Hence, our model confirms 
the  paradox  of  cooperation  reported  in  the  literature  on  international  environmental 
agreements with respect to cost benefit ratio, and adds to other dimensions related to the 
degree of excludability and rivalry.
Our model also allows shedding light on the discussion of Sandler and Arce [49] mentioned 
in the Introduction about the duality between public good games (low degree of rivalry, 31
approximated by a high value of the parameter  r  in our model) and commons games (high 
degree of rivalry, approximated by a low value of the parameter  r  in our model) and their 
claim that cooperation is more difficult to establish for the commons than for public goods. In 
our  model  if  the  degree  of  socially  constructed and technical excludability is not almost 
perfect, no cooperation is the only stable outcome, regardless of the value of  r  (Result 8). 
This suggests that the duality between public goods and the common pool resources holds, 
except that in the non-cooperative equilibrium, payoffs and stocks benefit from a high growth 
rate r  and the relative difference between no and full cooperation becomes smaller (result 
6b). If socially and technical excludability is sufficiently high, then the duality may break 
down: a high value of  r  may make partial cooperation possible whereas this may not be 
possible with a low value of  r . Again, with a high growth rate  r , the relative difference 
between no, partial and full cooperation diminishes.  
This paper suggests several avenues for future research. For instance, Pintassilgo et al. [42] 
have  shown  that  asymmetry  (with  respect  to  the  cost  parameter)  can  be  conducive  to 
cooperation if accompanied by an appropriate transfer scheme. Therefore, it seems promising 
to relax the restriction of identical countries and/or symmetric migration patterns. Finally, we 
expect that more cooperation might be possible if players not only consider the market-value 
of the resource but also its existence value. 
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Table I: Classification of Impure Public Goods 
      High    Å  Excludability   Æ  Low
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Table II: Simulation Runs*  
Simulation Runs  c r d D
A  0.5  0.5  0 – 1.28  0 – 1.0 
B 0.25 - 0.75  0.5 0 – 1.28  0 – 1.0 
C  0.5  0.25 - 0.75  0 – 1.28  0 – 1.0 
*  Parameter variations in a simulation run are indicated bold;  p 1   , q 1    and  tot k 4    are 
assumed throughout.38
Figure 1: Migration Pattern and Spatial Allocation of Property Rights*
*  Arrows indicate potential dispersal
Figure 2a: Incentive to Leave a Two-player Coalition* 
* The incentive to deviate is expressed as a fraction of the payoff of a coalition member. i.e. 
* * *
i i i i G : (C\{i}) (C ) / (C ) 3 3 3 ª º    ¬ ¼ . For the cost and growth parameter base case values 
are assumed (c 0.5    and r 0.5   ).
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Figure 2b: Stability of the Two-player Coalition in Parameter Space*
*  Both triangles define parameter combinations    d,D  for which the two-player coalition is 
stable. The smaller, light shaded triangle refers to base case values for the cost and growth 
parameter (c 0.5    and  r 0.5   ) whereas the larger, dark shaded triangle corresponds to the 
conditions that are most favorable for cooperation (c 0.75    and r 0.75   ).